Updated August 27, 2026. Reporting cut-off: 18:20 CEST. This edition includes Bank Frick’s H1 report released today.
Liechtenstein bank results for the first half of 2026 look uniformly strong until you ask where the profit came from. LGT earned CHF 281.6 million, up 17%. LLB earned CHF 105.0 million, up 15.3%. VP Bank made CHF 32.4 million, up 12.7%. Kaiser Partner reported CHF 6.7 million, up 14.7%. Bank Frick earned CHF 4.3 million, down roughly 5%, while Neue Bank’s profit eased to CHF 3.2 million even as its revenue rose 7.8%.
Those are not six versions of the same result. LGT is beginning to collect economies of scale from earlier expansion. LLB and VP Bank converted cost reductions into higher profit. Kaiser combined new client money with growth across interest and fee income. Bank Frick defended profit despite an 18.4% revenue decline and CHF 485 million of net outflows. Neue Bank absorbed the damage from lower Swiss franc rates by expanding commissions and financial transactions, then spent part of the gain on people and projects.
That distinction matters. With the Swiss National Bank’s policy rate at 0%, 2026 is the first clean test of which Liechtenstein private banks can grow after the easy interest-income years. This report separates durable client activity from market lift, one-offs and cost cuts.
| Bank | H1 profit | Profit change | Assets under management | Net new money | Revenue change | Fee / commission change | Tier 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LGT Group | CHF 281.6m | +17.0% | CHF 412.6bn | CHF 12.3bn | +5.0% | +7.0% services | 18.0% CET1 |
| LLB Group | CHF 105.0m | +15.3% | CHF 115.0bn | CHF 2.2bn | +0.9% | +5.9% net | 18.5% |
| VP Bank Group | CHF 32.4m | +12.7% | CHF 57.1bn | CHF 1.4bn | -2.2% | +7.8% net | 26.0% |
| Kaiser Partner | CHF 6.7m | +14.7% | CHF 10.3bn | CHF 0.5bn | +3.5% | +5.3% | 26.0%* |
| Bank Frick | CHF 4.3m | -5.0% | CHF 6.914bn | CHF -485m | -18.4% | +11.7% net | 16.5% CET1 |
| Neue Bank | CHF 3.2m | “Slightly lower” | CHF 7.89bn | CHF 61.4m | +7.8% | +13.3% | 28.3% |
Sources: official H1 2026 releases and reports from LGT, LLB, VP Bank, Kaiser Partner, Bank Frick and Neue Bank’s August 25 release, cross-checked against the bank’s official LinkedIn publication and two Liechtenstein news reproductions. *Kaiser’s Tier 1 ratio is the latest disclosed figure at December 31, 2025; its short H1 release did not provide an updated ratio. Rounded figures may not add precisely.
The Profit Boom Is Really a Test of Operating Leverage
Four banks disclosed double-digit profit growth, but the operating leverage came from different places. LGT’s income rose 5% while expenses increased 2%, the cleanest scale effect in the group. Kaiser reported top-line growth across both interest and commission income. LLB’s operating income rose just 0.9%, while expenses fell 6.8%. VP Bank’s income declined 2.2%, yet expenses fell faster, by 5.3%.
There is nothing inherently weak about cost-led profit. A bank that has spent heavily on acquisitions or technology should eventually collect the efficiency benefit. Still, the distinction matters for forecasting. Revenue can compound with new mandates. A cost base cannot be cut forever without touching capacity, controls or service.
Reported H1 Profit Change: Four Growth Stories, One Decline
Year-on-year change where an exact comparison is available. Bank Frick’s muted bar shows a decline; Neue Bank described profit as slightly lower without quantifying the comparison.
Source: bank H1 2026 releases and financial statements. Bar lengths compare the absolute size of each change against the 17% maximum; the muted Bank Frick bar denotes a decline. N/D means no exact year-on-year percentage was disclosed.
The first-half winner depends on the question: LGT produced the largest profit and inflow; LLB delivered the lowest reported cost-income ratio; Kaiser showed the highest new-money intensity; Neue Bank delivered the clearest fee-income pivot; VP Bank paired strong inflows with unfinished efficiency work; Bank Frick showed how far cost discipline can protect profit when revenue and client assets retreat together.
LGT: Scale Finally Grew Revenue Faster Than Cost
LGT’s CHF 281.6 million profit and CHF 12.3 billion of organic net new assets dominate this comparison in absolute terms. More interestingly, total operating income rose 5% to CHF 1.49 billion while expenses increased only 2% to CHF 1.09 billion. After years of expansion across Europe, Australia and Asia, that three-point gap is evidence that the platform is beginning to scale.
The income mix is also suited to a low-rate environment. Service income, already LGT’s largest contributor, grew 7% to CHF 1.00 billion. Trading and other operating income rose 1% to CHF 325.9 million. Net interest income fell only 2% to CHF 156.6 million. The cost-income ratio improved to 73.3% from 76.8% at year-end, even as LGT added 62 full-time-equivalent positions.
There is one comparability caveat. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia Private Advice business acquired in June 2025 is included in H1 2026 but not in the prior-year period. LGT nevertheless reports the CHF 12.3 billion as organic net inflows, separate from acquisition effects. Our verdict: this is the clearest scale result, but the acquisition makes the 5% revenue comparison less clean than the inflow figure. Our dedicated analysis asks whether LGT can remain personal at CHF 412.6 billion of AUM.
LLB: Excellent Execution, but Normalize the CHF 10.9 Million One-Off
LLB’s CHF 105.0 million profit is a strong result. Assets under management reached CHF 115 billion, net new money rose from CHF 1.4 billion to CHF 2.2 billion, and inflows came from both business divisions and all three booking centres: Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Austria. The growth was not confined to one relationship team or one geography.
The income statement is more nuanced. Net fee and commission income increased 5.9% to CHF 133.8 million, with custody fees up 20.9% and advisory and management fees up 16.8%. Net interest income fell 3.1%; after expected credit losses, it fell 15.9%. This is exactly the rotation a low-rate private bank needs, although the interest line deserves monitoring.
LLB also received CHF 10.9 million from a referral agreement linked to its strategic withdrawal from the Middle East. The bank did not hide the effect: its cost-income ratio was 59.5%, or 61.6% after adjusting for that additional income. Both readings remain better than 65.7% a year earlier. Meanwhile, integration synergies from the former ZKB Austria and roughly 60 fewer full-time positions helped reduce costs.
Our verdict: LLB’s efficiency improvement is real, but the 15.3% profit increase should not be projected mechanically into H2. For more context on its balance-sheet standing, see our analysis of Moody’s Aa1 upgrade of LLB.
VP Bank: New Money Is Recovering Faster Than Efficiency
VP Bank brought in CHF 1.4 billion of net new money, equal to 5.2% annualised growth, and lifted assets under management 6.4% to CHF 57.1 billion. The bank said inflows were especially strong in Liechtenstein and Switzerland and in its Intermediaries and Asset Servicing businesses. Positive market performance added another CHF 2.0 billion.
The revenue mix improved where it needed to. Commission and service income grew 7.8% to CHF 74.4 million, more than offsetting a 4.9% fall in net interest income. VP says the revised private-banking value proposition is generating about CHF 7 million of additional recurring annual income. That is a specific and testable claim, not just strategy language.
However, total operating income still declined because trading income fell 13.9% and the prior-year period included CHF 4.6 million of one-off insurance proceeds. Costs fell to CHF 135.2 million, lifting profit, but the 78.8% cost-income ratio remains much higher than LLB’s. VP also warns that new-money growth should normalise and that its second half is usually weaker.
Our verdict: the fee repair and new money are encouraging. The next proof point is whether VP can push its cost-income ratio down through revenue growth, rather than another round of reductions.
Kaiser Partner: The Smallest Denominator Creates the Strongest Inflow Signal
Kaiser Partner’s CHF 500 million of net new assets is striking beside CHF 9.7 billion of opening assets under management. On rounded figures, clients added new money equal to roughly 5.1% of opening AUM in six months. That is the highest unannualised inflow intensity among the six reporting groups in this comparison.
Importantly, revenue also moved in the right direction. Gross income rose 3.5% to CHF 30.4 million. Commission and service income increased 5.3% to CHF 19.1 million, while net interest income rose 4.0% to CHF 6.9 million despite the Swiss franc rate pressure hurting larger peers.
The caveat is disclosure depth. Kaiser’s concise release did not include H1 operating expenses, cost-income ratio or an updated capital ratio. Its latest annual report showed a 26.0% Tier 1 ratio after dividend distribution at the end of 2025. The bank’s private-trust model and family ownership are differentiated, but investors and prospective clients cannot assess H1 operating leverage as precisely as they can at the listed banks.
Our verdict: Kaiser published the most persuasive organic-growth signal. A fuller half-year statement would make the quality of the profit increase easier to judge.
Neue Bank: Choosing Revenue Diversification Over a Prettier Profit Number
Neue Bank is the outlier, and arguably the most interesting result. H1 profit slipped to CHF 3.2 million while the bank added four full-time-equivalent positions, taking the workforce to 97. It continued investing in advisory capability, processes and strategic projects. Operating expenses reached CHF 14.8 million.
Underneath that softer profit, the revenue shift was strong. Total business income rose 7.8% to CHF 18.9 million. Commission and service income increased 13.3% to CHF 9.4 million and income from financial transactions jumped 29.5% to CHF 5.3 million. Those gains more than replaced a 19.4% fall in interest income, which dropped to CHF 4.1 million.
Assets under management rose 3.4% to CHF 7.89 billion, but only CHF 61.4 million came from net new money. The more revealing figure is a 73.8% increase in discretionary asset-management mandates to CHF 779.5 million. That may improve future recurring revenue if the mandates persist. It also suggests existing clients entrusted more of their portfolios to the bank, a different growth route from simply opening new custody accounts.
Our verdict: Neue sacrificed some current profit to strengthen the fee engine. Its 28.3% Tier 1 ratio leaves room to invest, but H2 must show that the new mandate volume translates into durable earnings.
Bank Frick: Profit Held, but the Balance Sheet Sent a Louder Signal
Bank Frick’s CHF 4.285 million first-half profit was only about 5% below the CHF 4.509 million earned a year earlier. Read alone, that looks uneventful. The income statement says otherwise: total net income fell 18.4% to CHF 37.7 million. General administrative expenses declined 3.9% to CHF 36.7 million, while valuation allowances for credit risks fell from CHF 3.64 million to CHF 2.25 million. Cost control and lower credit charges did much of the work required to keep profit near budget.
The revenue mix reveals where pressure landed. Net interest income fell 15.1% to CHF 17.1 million as client deposits and the loan portfolio contracted. Net trading income dropped 38.6% to CHF 10.4 million amid weaker market activity and sharper competition in crypto. However, net fee and commission income increased approximately 11.7% to CHF 10.2 million. That fee growth matters because it shows the specialist platform still generated more service revenue even while its two larger income engines weakened.
The harder number is CHF 485 million of net outflows. Assets under management declined 9% from CHF 7.6 billion to CHF 6.914 billion; outflows alone equalled roughly 6.4% of opening AUM, with market and currency effects explaining the rest. Customer deposits fell 12.6% and the total balance sheet contracted 15.8% to CHF 2.343 billion. Against that contraction, equity increased to CHF 117.8 million and the CET1 ratio improved from 15.3% to 16.5%.
Bank Frick’s operating data makes the result more nuanced than a simple outflow story. It opened 87 additional client relationships, active capital-market issuances rose from 183 to 195, and fund assets remained stable at CHF 1.9 billion. Yet assets under administration in Capital Markets Solutions fell from CHF 5.4 billion to CHF 2.8 billion, mainly because crypto ETP values corrected sharply. Client count, product activity and reported volume can therefore move in opposite directions at a blockchain-focused bank.
Our verdict: Bank Frick defended its CHF 8.4 million full-year profit guidance, but H2 must prove that new relationships and fee growth can offset concentration-sensitive outflows and weaker trading. The key client question is not whether blockchain banking is growing; it is how much of the bank’s revenue and reported volume depends on crypto valuations, a small number of large relationships and activity-sensitive products. The official Bank Frick H1 2026 report provides the complete statements, while our separate Bank Frick valuation analysis examines the business model.
AUM Movement Since December 2025
An indexed slope chart makes banks of very different size comparable. December 2025 equals 100 for each bank.
Sources: bank H1 releases. Kaiser uses its stated 5.6% increase; other indices are calculated from published year-end and June AUM. Indexing compares growth, not financial strength or account suitability.
The Post-Rate-Tailwind Radar Shows Six Different Earnings Profiles
A single ranking would reward size or whichever metric we happened to choose. The radar below instead tests five things that matter in a 0% policy-rate environment: AUM growth, net new money as a share of opening AUM, fee momentum, total revenue momentum and resilience of net interest income.
Select a bank to see its raw data. The polygon uses a fixed 0-to-5 transformation explained below the chart. It is an earnings-profile tool, not a rating of safety, service quality or investment performance.
Liechtenstein Post-Rate-Tailwind Radar
LGT raw H1 data
Methodology: AUM score = growth / 1.5; net-new-money score = unannualised inflow as a percentage of opening AUM; fee score = growth / 3; revenue score maps -2.5% to 0 and +8% to 5; interest score maps -20% to 0 and +5% to 5. Scores are floored at 0 and capped at 5. Inputs come from the banks’ published H1 data. This original Easy Global Banking framework is descriptive, unweighted and not a recommendation.
BENDURA and Other Smaller Banks Still Matter Without H1 Numbers
As of our August 27 cut-off, BENDURA Bank, EFG Bank von Ernst and SIGMA Bank had not published a public H1 2026 result that we could verify. Absence from the main comparison therefore means not yet reported, not underperformance. Bank Frick is now included after publishing its report on August 27.
| Bank | Latest verified public baseline | What to watch next | Why it is not in the H1 ranking |
|---|---|---|---|
| BENDURA Bank | 2025 AUM CHF 4.047bn; net new money CHF 550.2m; profit CHF 12.8m; CET1 24.1% | Progress toward CHF 6.5bn AUM by 2030, Hong Kong-to-Liechtenstein flows, and whether revenue resumes growth | No public H1 2026 result verified by August 27 |
| EFG Bank von Ernst | 2025 AUM CHF 2.029bn; local profit CHF 20.5m; equity CHF 43.6m | How the small Liechtenstein entity contributes to the wider EFG network | No public H1 2026 local result verified |
| SIGMA Bank | 2025 AUM CHF 2.362bn; profit CHF 2.8m; equity CHF 177.1m | Whether its large equity base supports faster private-banking growth | No public H1 2026 result verified |
| Celsion Bank | Banking licence since February 18, 2026; 26 employees as of July 1 | Institutional adoption of its combined trading, custody, staking and commercial-banking model | New bank with no comparable prior-year half |
Sources: Liechtenstein Bankers Association member data as of December 31, 2025; BENDURA 2025 annual report summary; official bank news and download pages checked August 27, 2026. Banque Havilland (Liechtenstein), in voluntary liquidation, and Banking Circle, a payment-infrastructure bank, are not treated as like-for-like private-bank peers.
BENDURA is particularly worth revisiting. Its CHF 550.2 million of 2025 net new money equalled roughly 15.9% of opening AUM, while gross income edged down from CHF 56.0 million to CHF 55.0 million. That tension – strong asset gathering without immediate revenue growth – is exactly the sort of issue a half-year report can clarify.
Bank Frick’s newly published result confirms why specialist banks need a different analytical lens. Its growing issuance count and stable fund assets coexisted with lower trading income, client outflows and a sharp decline in crypto-linked assets under administration. Product adoption does not always translate immediately into reported asset growth.
Liechtenstein Is Becoming a Two-Speed Banking Centre
The FMA says consolidated assets of Liechtenstein’s predominantly domestically owned banking sector exceed CHF 105 billion, about 15 times the country’s GDP. LGT, LLB and VP Bank account for more than 90% of that total. At the same time, smaller banks keep winning business through fiduciary integration, intermediary services, private-label funds, digital assets or specific regional networks.
This is not a conventional middle-market structure. The centre is developing as a barbell: regulated global platforms at one end and specialist boutiques at the other. A bank trapped between them needs either a distribution advantage or unusually efficient infrastructure.
LGT is the clearest example of scale. Its 2026 result now sits in the comparative tables and charts above; the separate report goes deeper into ownership, private markets and whether a global platform can preserve relationship-manager autonomy.
The new arrival, Celsion Bank, sharpens the specialist side. Its February licence and July 2026 inclusion in the Bankers Association’s member data add an institutional digital-asset bank to a market where Bank Frick already has deep experience. That may expand the centre’s product perimeter, but it also raises the cost of cyber resilience, third-party oversight and specialist compliance. Liechtenstein’s DORA implementation has applied since February 2025; technology is both a sales proposition and a regulated operating risk.
What the Results Mean for a Private Client
Half-year profit is not a substitute for bank selection. It does, however, tell you where an institution is investing, which income streams it depends on and how much room it has to absorb change. Those clues should shape due diligence.
| Observed result | Potential client advantage | Question to ask before onboarding |
|---|---|---|
| High recurring fee growth | More scale in advisory and discretionary mandates | Did revenue rise because clients delegated more assets, because markets lifted balances, or because pricing changed? |
| Large cost reduction | Potentially faster, simpler operating model | Which service roles, booking centres or response times changed with the lower cost base? |
| Strong net new money | Evidence that clients are choosing or consolidating with the bank | Did flows come from many clients and regions, or a small number of large relationships? |
| High capital ratio | Capacity to absorb losses and invest, subject to risk-weighted exposures | How do capital, liquidity, credit quality and legal-entity structure fit together? |
| Rapid technology investment | Better reporting, onboarding and specialist asset support | Which systems are proprietary, which are outsourced, and how is DORA third-party risk governed? |
Which Liechtenstein Banking Model Deserves Your Next Question?
Select the requirements that genuinely matter. The tool identifies a business model to investigate, not a bank approval outcome.
International applicants also need to separate bank quality from bank fit. Nationality, residence, source of wealth, expected activity, structure and tax documentation can all change the answer. Our Liechtenstein private banking guide for non-residents covers that onboarding layer, while our Liechtenstein versus Switzerland analysis compares the two financial centres.
Our 2026-2028 Outlook: A Revenue Test, Not an AUM Race
The SNB kept its policy rate at 0% in June and reduced the threshold factor for remunerating bank sight deposits from August. Unless rates rise materially, net interest income will remain a weak foundation for easy growth. The forward question is therefore not which bank reports the highest AUM. It is which bank can convert client assets into recurring, defensible revenue without pricing itself out of the market.
Base Case
Fee income grows, net interest stays pressured, and cost reductions become harder after the first integration gains.
Watch: commission growth, mandate penetration, gross margin and stable service capacity.
Upside Case
Safe-haven inflows remain broad, markets support AUM, and digital or fiduciary specialisation attracts new international business.
Watch: organic net money across several regions, not one-off transfers or acquisitions.
Downside Case
A strong franc, lower rates, weaker markets and rising DORA or AML costs squeeze smaller revenue pools at the same time.
Watch: falling revenue with rising headcount, persistent outflows, or repeated reliance on non-recurring income.
By 2028, we expect the gap between platform banks and specialists to widen. LLB and VP have the capital and operating scale to spread technology and regulatory costs across larger client bases. Kaiser, Neue, BENDURA and Bank Frick need to make specialisation visible in either inflows, fee margins or services larger banks cannot deliver as flexibly.
That does not make consolidation inevitable. Several boutiques have patient owners and strong capital. It does make strategic ambiguity expensive. A private bank no longer gets paid merely for being located in Liechtenstein; it must show what clients are buying there.
Use the Results as a Filter, Not a Verdict
Easy Global Banking helps international clients compare suitable Liechtenstein, Swiss and Singapore private-banking relationships. We assess the intended account purpose, source of wealth, investment needs, structure and realistic onboarding fit before approaching a financial institution. We do not promise approval or investment performance.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which Liechtenstein bank reported the highest H1 2026 profit?
LGT reported the highest absolute group profit at CHF 281.6 million. It was followed by LLB at CHF 105.0 million, VP Bank at CHF 32.4 million, Kaiser Partner at CHF 6.7 million, Bank Frick at CHF 4.3 million and Neue Bank at CHF 3.2 million. LGT’s global group is much larger, so the absolute ranking should not be confused with an efficiency or safety ranking.
Which Liechtenstein bank had the strongest net new money growth?
Kaiser Partner had the highest unannualised inflow intensity in this six-bank set: CHF 0.5 billion of net new assets against roughly CHF 9.7 billion of opening AUM. LGT led in absolute net new assets with CHF 12.3 billion, followed by LLB with CHF 2.2 billion and VP Bank with CHF 1.4 billion. Bank Frick reported CHF 485 million of net outflows.
Why is BENDURA not ranked on H1 2026 profit?
We could not verify a public H1 2026 result from BENDURA by 18:20 CEST on August 27, 2026. Its omission is a reporting-timing issue, not a judgment on performance. Bank Frick’s August 27 report has now been added to the comparison.
Does a high Tier 1 ratio make a bank the best choice?
No. Tier 1 capital is an important resilience measure, but it must be read with risk-weighted assets, liquidity, credit quality, profitability and the relevant legal entity. It also says nothing about whether the bank accepts a client’s profile or offers the required service.
Can a non-resident open a Liechtenstein private bank account?
Some Liechtenstein banks serve non-residents, but acceptance depends on residence, nationality, source of wealth, account purpose, documentation, tax compliance and the proposed asset level. Published bank results do not indicate that a particular application will be approved.
Sources and Methodology
We used bank-issued H1 2026 releases or financial reports for LGT, LLB, VP Bank, Kaiser Partner and Bank Frick. Neue Bank figures were cross-checked against the bank’s official publication and two local reproductions of its August 25 media release. Sector totals and member-bank baselines come from the FMA Liechtenstein, the Liechtenstein Office of Statistics and the Liechtenstein Bankers Association. The interest-rate context comes from the Swiss National Bank’s June 2026 monetary policy assessment.
Group AUM, local legal-entity assets and custody assets are not interchangeable. Comparisons use the definition published by each bank and are labelled accordingly. Charts may use calculated percentages from rounded public figures; those calculations are identified in their captions. This article is financial journalism and banking-market analysis, not investment, tax or legal advice.
